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To date, most social network analyses (SNAs) of terrorist groups have used
network data that provide snap-shots of the groups at a single point in time.
Seldom have they used network data that take into account how the groups have
changed over time. In this article, a unique longitudinal network data set, the
Noordin Top terrorist network from 2001 to 2010, is examined in order to
explore whether a recently developed method – social network change detection
(SNCD) – can help analysts monitor a dark network’s topography (e.g.
centralization, density, degree of fragmentation) in order to detect significant
changes in its structure and identify possible causes. The application of change
detection to this historical data set illustrates the method’s potential usefulness,
including its ability to detect significant changes in the network in response to a
series of exogenous factors, such as the acquisition of bombing materials, the
capture of key leaders and groups, and the death of Noordin himself. The
method’s inability to detect other significant events, however, highlights
important limitations when working with it. While SNCD should not be the only
method analysts have at their disposal, the results detailed in this article suggest
that it should be included in their toolkit.
Keywords: social network analysis; social network change detection; dark
networks; longitudinal networks
1. Introduction
Dark networks, that is, covert and illegal networks (Raab & Milward, 2003), evolve
over time. Endogenous and exogenous factors lead ties to form or dissolve and
actors to enter or leave the network, which in turn causes changes in the network’s
structure that may affect its behavior and ability to launch successful attacks. For
example, the removal of central actors or the dissolution of trusted ties can disrupt
the flow of information through a network, making it more difficult for it to mobilize.
Similarly, the defection of peripheral actors or the formation of new ties can lead a
network to become increasingly dense and more isolated, increasing the likelihood
that it will engage in extreme behavior (Hafez, 2004; Sunstein, 2009). Or again, if a
dark network’s one and only bomb maker is forced to move hundreds of miles away
from where the network carries out its operations, then the network’s efficiency will
almost certainly suffer (Everton, 2012).
Although the study and use of the term “dark networks” has grown dramatically in
recent years, as has the use of social network analysis (SNA) to explore and under-
stand the phenomenon, most analyses of dark networks have used data that provided
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only snap-shots at single points in time (Koschade, 2006; Krebs, 2001; Roberts &
Everton, 2011; Sageman, 2004). Seldom have they drawn on longitudinal network
data that capture how groups have changed and adapted, making it difficult to
explore the potential causes and consequences of such changes. Nevertheless, a
few scholars, building on the insights of research on “light” or “bright networks”,
have begun to apply longitudinal modeling techniques to dark network data (Hu,
Kaza, & Chen, 2009; McCulloh & Carley, 2011; Xu, Hu, & Chen, 2009). This
article contributes to this growing body of research by focusing on techniques
for detecting sudden and significant changes in the structures of dark networks and
possibly identifying the causes lying behind such changes. In particular, using a
unique longitudinal network data set, the Noordin Top terrorist network (2001–
2010), it explores whether a recently developed methodology, social network
change detection (SNCD), can provide analysts with a useful technique for detecting
when a significant change has occurred within a network, identifying the causes lying
behind the change, and potentially preventing (but not predicting) unwanted future
events.1 Data from Noordin’s network are used here because it allows us to test
whether SNCD is able to detect known significant changes using well-documented
historical data.
2. The longitudinal analysis of dark networks
Historically, longitudinal network data have been difficult to come by and the
methods for examining them underdeveloped. As a case in point, only in the
final chapter of Wasserman and Faust’s (1994) classic SNA text do the authors
highlight the importance of developing easy-to-use methods for examining longi-
tudinal network data. In recent years, this situation has begun to change. Longitudi-
nal network data and methods for their analysis have become more common. Many
of these approaches are largely descriptive in nature, but they are becoming increas-
ingly more sophisticated, many of which employ stochastic approaches that seek to
detect the underlying mechanisms of network change (Breiger, Carley, & Pattison,
2003; Doreian & Stockman, 1997; McCulloh & Carley, 2011; de Nooy, 2011;
Snijders, 2005; Snijders, Bunt, & Steglich, 2010; Steglich, Snijders, & Pearson,
2010).
To date, most longitudinal analyses of social networks have focused on bright net-
works. Only a handful has examined dark networks. One example is Xu et al.’s (2009)
analysis of the global Salafi jihad that found that it not only evolved into a scale-free
network but appears to have passed through three distinct phases (i.e. emerging,
maturing, and disintegrating). Another, which builds on Kossinets and Watts’s
(2006) study of network evolution, is Hu et al.’s (2009) analysis of a co-offending
network, which discovered that acquaintances and shared vehicle affiliations served
as key facilitators of tie formation, while age, race, and gender did not. More recently,
McCulloh and Carley (2011) applied SNCD analysis to a number of longitudinal net-
works, including the al-Qaeda communication network from 1988 to 2004, and ident-
ified events that may have caused sudden changes in the various networks.
Unfortunately, few of these newly developed modeling techniques are easy to use;
in fact, most require specialized software, which is why descriptive approaches
remain popular.
A notable exception to this is SNCD analysis (McCulloh & Carley, 2011), which
is explored in this article and implemented in the social network analysis software
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package, Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORAw) (Carley, 2001–2011). SNCD is a
method that facilitates real-time analysis and can potentially alert analysts as to
whether and when a sudden change has occurred in a network. This, in turn,
allows them to further investigate the period at which the change occurred in
order to identify the potential causes for the change and possibly prevent (but not
predict) unwanted future events (McCulloh & Carley, 2011). Because terrorist
organizations typically begin planning their attacks before they carry them out,
SNCD could alert military/law enforcement analysts to a shift in the network struc-
ture prior to an attack, allowing them to take potentially preventative measures
(McCulloh & Carley, 2011). For example, dark networks often operate with as
few ties as possible to evade authorities; however, they may form temporary ties
immediately before an attack, such as holding meetings in order to carry out critical
tasks or transfer materials or resources from one actor to another (Krebs, 2001). Tie
formation such as this can alter the network’s overall topography in such a way that
it is detected by SNCD. Before examining how this can be done, we need to first
consider the topographical measures, of which there are many, that will be used in
this article.
3. Network topography: centralization
A well-developed body of research has explored the extent to which an organization is
centralized impacts its performance (Nohria & Eccles, 1992; Podolny & Page, 1998;
Powell, 1985, 1990; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). This literature typically identifies
two ideal types of organizational form: networks and hierarchies. The former are
seen as decentralized, informal, and/or organic, and the latter are seen as centralized,
formal, and/or bureaucratic useful (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Powell, 1990; Ronfeldt &
Arquilla, 2001). While this distinction is useful (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Castells,
1996; Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994; Ronfeldt & Arquilla,
2001), social network analysts regard all organizations as networks whether they are
hierarchical or decentralized.
Current research, with regard to both bright and dark networks, suggests there is an
optimal level of network centralization. For example, in his analysis of successful (and
unsuccessful) religious movements, Stark (1987, 1996) identified centralized authority
as an important factor but noted that too much centralization can be a bad thing.
Successful religious movements, such as the Mormon (LDS) Church, learn to
balance centralized authority structures with decentralized ones (Stark, 2005).
Research on dark networks, which builds significantly on bright network research,2
includes several studies that have examined the potential advantages and disadvantages
of hierarchical (i.e. centralized) or network (i.e. decentralized) forms of organization,
and how each structure affects a network’s ability to operate and survive in hostile
environments (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008; Kenney, 2007; Sanı́n & Giustozzi,
2010).3
The optimal balance, however, almost certainly varies depending on an organiz-
ation’s environmental context (Tucker, 2008). Because existing literature demon-
strates that decentralized networks tend to be better suited for solving non-routine,
complex, and/or rapidly changing challenges due to their adaptability (Saxenian,
1994, 1996), one could argue that in hostile environments where networks have to
quickly adapt to changing situations, resilient dark networks will fall more toward
the decentralized end of the continuum than the hierarchical one. Even in this
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regard, however, dark networks that become too decentralized may find it difficult to
mobilize resources and coordinate sophisticated attacks, leading them to underper-
form. Conversely, in relatively friendly contexts, dark networks can operate quite
successfully as hierarchical organizations; however, if they become too hierarchical,
they may stifle creativity and make themselves vulnerable to decapitation strategies in
the future (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001). Al-Qaeda’s hier-
archical nature prior to Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan in late 2001, fol-
lowed by a more decentralized structure after the invasion, is an example of this
(Sageman, 2008).
Social network analysts typically estimate the degree to which a network revolves
around different centers of power. More specifically, they use the variation in actor cen-
trality within the network to measure the level of centralization; more variation yields
higher network centralization scores, while less variation yields lower scores. Those
familiar with social network analysis know that there are a variety of metrics from
which the level of centralization measures can be estimated. In this article, two –
degree and betweenness centralization – are analyzed. These measures are imperfect
because they take the difference between the network’s largest centrality score and









where Cmax equals the largest centrality score for all actors and C(ni)is the centrality
score for actor ni, and max
!
[Cmax − C(ni)] is the theoretical maximum possible
sum of differences in actor centrality. In other words, network centralization is the
ratio of the actual sum of differences in actor centrality over the theoretical
maximum, yielding a score somewhere between 0.0 and 1.0. This means that the
larger the centralization index, the more likely it is that a single actor is very central
whereas the other actors are not (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In spite of their limitation,
these measures are used here because they are the most common and widely used cen-
tralization measures. Subsequent analyses, however, will want to consider using other
or additional centralization measures, such as those that measure the variance and/or
standard deviation of centrality scores (Coleman, 1964; Everton, 2012; Hoivik &
Gleditsch, 1975; Snijders, 1981).
Finally, because network centralization scores are based on various measures of
centrality (e.g. degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector), they need to be inter-
preted in light of the centrality measure being used. For example, degree centrality
counts the number of ties of each individual actor, which means that centralization
metrics based on it would capture the extent to which one or a handful of actors
possess a lot of ties whereas other actors in the network do not. By contrast, a centra-
lization measure based on betweenness centrality, which measures the extent to which
actors lie on the shortest path between other pairs of actors in the network, could be
interpreted as indicating the degree to which one or a handful of a network’s actors
are in a position of brokerage.
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4. Network topography: cohesion
In what is now considered a classic study, Granovetter (1973, 1974) discovered that
when it came to finding jobs, people were far more likely to use personal contacts
than other means. Moreover, of those who found their jobs through personal contacts,
most were acquaintances (i.e. weak ties) rather than close friends (i.e. strong ties). Gran-
ovetter concluded this was so because not only do we have more weak ties than strong
ties (because weak ties demand less of our time), but also because our weak ties are
more likely to form the bridges that tie dense clusters of people together. This led
him to argue that whatever material or non-material resource is to be diffused (e.g.
information, influence, trust, wealth, disease), it will reach a greater number of
people when it passes through weak rather than strong ties. However, Granovetter
did not argue that strong ties are of no value. He and others have noted that while
weak ties provide individuals with access to information and resources beyond what
is available in their immediate social circles, strong ties are more likely to be sources
of support in times of stress and uncertainty (Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Krackhardt,
1992; Stark, 2007).
An important implication of all this is that people’s networks differ in terms of their
mix of weak and strong ties. They range from local (i.e. provincial) ones, consisting of
primarily of strong, redundant ties, to worldly (i.e. cosmopolitan) ones, consisting of
numerous weak ties and few strong ties (Stark, 2007). It also suggests that peoples’ net-
works should be neither too provincial nor cosmopolitan but rather should be some-
where between the two extremes. Subsequent studies of bright networks have lent
empirical support for this conclusion and suggest that a curvilinear relationship
exists between the ideal mix of ties and network effectiveness across a spectrum of con-
texts, including the risk of an individual committing suicide, the success of Broadway
musicals, and the abilities of firms and companies to perform in the market successfully
(Pescosolido & Georgianna, 1989; Uzzi, 1996, 2008; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). Similarly,
an increasing number of dark network studies have found that they too cannot be too
provincial or cosmopolitan although it is typically discussed through the prism of bal-
ancing operational capacity and network (Bakker, Raab, & Milward, 2011;
Bienenstock & Bonacich, 2003; Enders & Su, 2007; Milward & Raab, 2006). What
constitutes a particular dark network’s optimum balance will also vary depending on
the environment in which it operates (e.g. the IRA can operate more openly in
Ireland than al-Qaeda can in the USA). However, because the survival of dark networks
depends largely on their ability to recruit members whom they can trust (Berman, 2009;
Tilly, 2004, 2005), they tend to recruit through strong (rather than weak) ties, which
suggests networks formed primarily by strong ties become increasingly connected as
ties form between previously unlinked actors (Granovetter, 1973; Holland & Leinhardt,
1971; Rapoport, 1953a, 1953b; Rapoport & Horvath, 1961). Thus, one should expect
that dark networks will, all else being equal, be more interconnected than bright
networks.
As with centralization metrics, there are a variety of cohesion measures. Density,
which is the ratio of actual to possible ties, is perhaps the most common. Unfortunately,
it is inversely related to network size (i.e. all else being equal, the larger the network, the
lower the density) because the number of possible lines increases exponentially as the
number of actors in the network grows, while the number of ties that each actor can
maintain tends to be limited (Scott, 2000). This means that as a measure it is only
useful when comparing networks of the same size, which is often not the case when
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examining dark network data over time, such as is done here. Consequently, two
alternative measures are used here: fragmentation (i.e. the additive inverse of cohesion)
(Borgatti, 2006) and the Watts–Strogatz clustering coefficient (Watts, 1999; Watts &
Strogatz, 1998).
Network fragmentation is equal to the proportion of all pairs of unconnected actors.4
Formally, given a matrix R in which rij ¼ 1 if actor i can reach actor j and rij ¼ 0 other-








where n(n 2 1) equals the total possible number of reachable pairs with the network of
size n. More simply, it equals the ratio of the number of pairs of actors that can reach
one another over the number of pairs of actors in the network (Borgatti 2006).
The Watts–Strogatz clustering coefficient (Watts, 1999; Watts & Strogatz, 1998) is
calculated by first taking each actor’s ego network (i.e. each actor’s ties to other actors
– a.k.a. as an actor’s “alters” – and the ties between them), then calculating the density
of each ego network (but not including ego or ego’s ties in the calculation – i.e. only the
ties between ego’s alters are used), and then taking the average of these scores. More
formally, if actor i (i.e. ego) has ki alters, then at most ki(ki 2 1)/2 ties can exist between
them; if Ci (i.e. the local clustering coefficient)
5 equals the fraction of these ties that






In other words, !C is “the probability that two (actors) will be connected, given that each
is also connected to a ‘mutual friend’” (Watts, 1999, pp. 498–99).
5. Data: The Noordin Top terrorist network
The following analysis examines longitudinal data on the Noordin Mohammad Top ter-
rorist network to explore the potential of SNCD. Until he was killed by Indonesian
authorities in September 2009, Top was Indonesia’s most wanted terrorist and
thought to be the mastermind behind a series of terrorist attacks in Indonesia,
namely the 2003 JW Marriott bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy attack, the
October 2005 Bali bombing, and the July 2009 JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton bombings.
His rise to prominence can be traced to his time at Luqmanul Hakiem, an Islamic board-
ing school in Malaysia, which he first attended as a student (in 1995) and later served as
the school’s director (International Crisis Group, 2006). In 1998, he formally joined
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Islamic terrorist group based in Indonesia (Jones, 2009).6
During his early years with JI and prior to forming his own group, Noordin formed
close ties with well-established and operationally experienced individuals in JI’s
regional subdivision, Mantiqi I. His membership in Mantiqi I, and his relationships
with JI’s more extreme elements, eventually led him to begin operating independently
from the JI command structure (International Crisis Group, 2006). By early 2003,
Noordin began to split from the traditional JI structure. This process was jumpstarted
by his late 2002 acquisition of explosives left over from the 2000 Christmas Eve
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bombings. These newly acquired resources provided Noordin with an opportunity to
operate independently and to fill the operational void created by the arrests and the
deaths of several of his JI predecessors in the wake of the first Bali bombings.
Noordin, along with a core set of JI members, used these explosives for his network’s
first operation: the 2003 JW Marriott attack. Over the next 2 years, his network, which
went by several names7 and included many non-JI members, launched several success-
ful attacks against “Western targets” in Indonesia. The group’s success, however, came
with notable setbacks brought on by increased counter-terrorism operations following
each operation. Noordin was eventually placed on the FBI’s Seeking Information-War
on Terrorism List in 2006. Nevertheless, he and his associates carried out simultaneous
bombings 3 years later against the Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in August 2009,
which subsequently led to stepped-up police operations and his eventual demise in Sep-
tember 2009 when he and a few of his key associates were killed by Indonesian auth-
orities. Not long after, his network essentially fell apart although some of the remaining
members of his network did try to reconstitute themselves under the leadership of Dul-
matin, the prominent bomber from the first Bali bombings (International Crisis Group,
2010).
To analyze Noordin’s network, relational data were extracted from two Inter-
national Crisis Group (ICG) reports: “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks”
(International Crisis Group, 2006) and “Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base”
(International Crisis Group, 2009). These data were supplemented with additional
open source literature in order to generate monthly time codes from January 2001
through December 2010, which accounts for when actors entered the network and if
and when they were arrested or killed. The two ICG reports on Noordin contain rich
one- and two-mode data on a variety of relations and affiliations (friendship, kinship,
meetings, etc.) along with significant attribute data (education, group membership,
physical status, etc.).8 From these reports, three networks (trust, operational, combined)
were constructed from several subnetworks each containing 237 individuals. In particu-
lar, the trust network was constructed by aggregating the one-mode classmate, friend-
ship, kinship, and soulmate9 subnetworks; the operational network was created by
aggregating four one-mode networks that were derived from corresponding two-
mode networks, namely logistics, meetings, operations, and training events; and the
combined network was constructed by combining the trust and operational networks.
It is the combined network that is analyzed below.
Time codes were assigned to each actor in the network that indicated when they
entered or left the combined network. Because this analysis treats members as
leaving the network if they were killed or arrested, the time-coded network is referred
to as a combined “alive and free” network because it captures which members at a given
time point were alive but not incarcerated. In assigning time codes, ties between actors
were assumed to remain constant over time. In other words, if two actors were coded as
friends at one point in time, they were assumed to remain friends throughout their
mutual presence in the networks.10 The one exception to this concerns the meetings
subnetwork where, following Krebs (2001), a meeting tie is assumed to form only
when the meeting took place (unless, of course, a tie was previously formed along
another relation such as friendship or kinship).
Critics might argue that we should have aggregated and combined these networks
differently, and that they do not accurately capture Noordin’s trust and operational net-
works. For example, some readers may contend that the classmate subnetwork might
not identify trust relationships. Although this may be true for other dark networks
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operating in different contexts, in Noordin’s case, many of the relationships that devel-
oped between network members began at schools such as Luqmanul Hakeim and even-
tually led to friendships, kinship through marriage, and operational relationships
(International Crisis Group, 2006; Ressa, 2003). Others may also question whether it
is justifiable to derive one-mode networks from two-mode data since shared affiliations
do not necessarily indicate the presence of a relationship between actors. While infer-
ring such relationships can be problematic in some cases, that is not the case here
because the two-mode data used are largely event-specific and two or more actors
involved in an event are highly likely to have interacted. For example, it is safe to
assume that some sort of tie formed between two or more actors participating in a
meeting at a specific date and location because the number of individuals who attended
the meetings included in this data set was quite small (less than seven). The operational
ties follow a similar pattern. While it is possible that individuals who participated in the
same operation may not have been involved during the same stage of the operation (sur-
veying targets, the actual attack, etc.) and therefore did not interact with one another, it
is also likely that when Noordin’s network planned and carried out an operation, it
tended to only recruit individuals it trusted, and as noted earlier, when two individuals
who do not know one another prior to joining a group share a common friend (i.e. a
strong tie, someone they trust), then it is likely that a tie will form between them
(Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Holland & Leinhardt, 1971; Rapoport, 1953a, 1953b;
Rapoport & Horvath, 1961). Moreover, the ICG reports often explicitly indicate that
two actors participating in the same operation did in fact interact directly. In short,
not inferring ties in these cases would lead this analysis to underestimate, rather than
overestimate, the number of ties within Noordin’s network.
6. Descriptive analysis
This article’s analysis begins by briefly examining how the network’s centralization
(degree and betweenness) and cohesion (fragmentation and clustering coefficient)
levels varied over time (Figure 1). In the upper panel of Figure 1, the black and gray
lines map the monthly degree and betweenness centralization from 2001 to 2010,
respectively; in the lower panel, the black and gray lines map the monthly fragmenta-
tion and average clustering coefficient over the same period of time, respectively. These
graphs suggest that Noordin’s Alive and Free Combined Network began to become
more centralized (and more cohesive) in 2003 (around time period 24), a process
that continued until 2006 (i.e. time period 60). In 2006, there is a somewhat noticeable
decrease in degree centralization followed by a sharp decrease in betweenness centra-
lization around February and March 2007 (i.e. time periods 74 and 75). This latter
decrease coincides with the removal of several key actors from the network because
of increased counter-terrorism operations by Indonesian authorities. Network centrali-
zation and cohesion then begin to plateau until mid-2009, a period of time when the
network was relatively inactive. Then, in September 2009 when Noordin and a few
of the network’s key members were killed (i.e. time period 105), the network
became significantly less centralized and far more fragmented. It was at this time
that the network essentially fell apart although as it was noted above, remnants of
the network did try to reconstitute a network later under the leadership of the Bali
bomber, Dulmatin (International Crisis Group, 2010).
The fact that Noordin’s network appears to have been significantly disrupted when
he was killed is consistent with Bakker, Raab, and Milward’s (2011) contention that,
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all else being equal, centralized dark networks are less resilient than
decentralized ones; that is, they are more likely to collapse if they suffer a shock to
the system much like Noordin’s network did. That the network collapsed after the
removal of key operatives also appears to lend support for kinetic (i.e. coercive) strat-
egies that remove key members (Roberts & Everton, 2011). While this conclusion
may be warranted, it is worth noting that when Noordin’s network was less centra-
lized, it may have been more resilient to the removal of key actors. Indeed, a separate
analysis suggests that Noordin’s network became more centralized in response to
earlier counter-terrorism efforts by Indonesian authorities, suggesting that these
Figure 1. Centralization and cohesion of Noordin Top terrorist network, 2001–2010.
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earlier efforts are what caused Noordin’s later removal to be effective (Everton &
Cunningham, 2011).
This article now turns to SNCD to see if a statistically significant change occurred in
Noordin’s network, and if so, whether it identified key events within the network’s
operational history. This in turn will help measure the effectiveness of SNCD as a
method of analysis.
7. Social network change detection
As with most statistical approaches, the analyst has to choose between numerous options
when using SNCD. The first step is to select the process by which to monitor change. One
option, the Shewhart x-bar chart method, was originally a quality control technique for
monitoring change in a business or industrial process when samples are collected at
regular intervals (Shewhart, 1927). The cumulative sum (CUSUM) control chart (Page,
1961) is generally seen as an improvement over the Shewhart x-bar because of its use of
sequential probability ratio testing (McCulloh & Carley, 2011). The final option, the expo-
nentially weighted moving average control chart (Roberts, 1959), has been shown to
perform similarly to CUSUM. This analysis follows McCulloh and Carley (2011) and
uses CUSUM for two reasons: (1) it is able to detect small changes over time, which facili-
tates the rapid detection of drastic changes in the network, and (2) its built-in change point
detection, which allows the analyst to identify the time at which the change began to occur
(McCulloh, 2009). Next, the number of networks needs to be selected in order to form a
baseline to which to compare later changes. In this case, 35 were selected (i.e. between
a quarter and a third of the total networks).11 No hard and fast rule appears to exist although
two or more networks are required to estimate normal behavior of the network, while five or
more are recommended in order to reduce variance in estimating the CUSUM parameters
(McCulloh, 2009). Finally, the threshold for what constitutes a significant change must be
chosen. This analysis uses ORA’s default threshold (i.e. 0.01/3.5), but again there is no
hard and fast rule here as to what constitutes an appropriate threshold. Thus, ORA’s
default threshold setting should be seen as a starting point, not as something that has
been written in stone. Keep in mind that if the threshold is set too high, then analysts
may mistake a sudden change for a normal one (i.e. a false negative); if it is set too low,
then they may mistake normal change for a sudden change (i.e. a false positive) and poten-
tially take unnecessary actions. Thus, analysts need to be careful in setting the threshold,
drawing heavily on experience, and being willing to adjust expectations in light of new
information. We take up this issue again in our discussion below. In the graphs that
follow, the thin, solid line running horizontal across the graphs in Figures 2 through 5
denotes the threshold. If a change in the network crosses this line, then it is assumed
that a significant change has occurred.
ORA’s SNCD output can at first glance be confusing because it graphs both signifi-
cant increases and decreases of a particular metric with lines that rise up from the base-
line. For example, in Figure 2, the gray line charts increases in degree centralization while
the black line charts decreases. Looking at Figure 2, both lines cross the decision
threshold, suggesting that a significant increase and a significant decrease in degree cen-
tralization occurred in the network during the time under consideration. The next step,
then, is to determine the time at which each change began to occur (i.e. point of detection)
in order to identify what factors may have led to the significant changes, and with SNCD
the time at which a significant change is deemed to have begun to occur is the point where
the line leaves the baseline and begins to rise (McCulloh & Carley, 2011). Looking at
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Figure 2, we can see that the black line, which captures decreases in centralization, begins
to change between September 2009 (105th month) and February 2010 (110th month).
This corresponds to the time frame from when Noordin was killed to when 56 terrorists,
including several members of Noordin’s network, were arrested or killed by Indonesian
authorities in Aceh (International Crisis Group, 2010). The gray line, which graphs
increases in centralization, leaves the baseline around February 2003 (25th month),
which coincides with stepped-up counter-terrorism operations in response to the first
Bali bombings that ultimately led to removal of several well-connected actors. It is
also about the time Noordin acquired the explosives left over from the 2000 Christmas
Eve bombings carried out by JI and began to separate himself from JI, which suggests
that Noordin’s acquisition of the explosives may have acted as a catalyst for him to
strike out on his own (International Crisis Group, 2006). Put differently, while he may
have long thought about beginning his own splinter group, it was not until he acquired
the necessary resources, in this case bombing materials, that he actually did so. As
social movement theorists repeatedly reminded us, without resources it is difficult for
insurgencies to mobilize (McAdam, 1982; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Smith, 1991,
1996). Thus, the increase in centralization may not have only been a response to exogen-
ous pressures, such as the capture of key Bali bombers and the efforts of Indonesian auth-
orities to shut Noordin’s network down, but it may have also been due to endogenous
factors such as Noordin’s leadership style that did not manifest itself until after he
acquired materials from the Christmas Day bombings.
Figure 3 (black line ¼ decrease; gray line ¼ increase), which maps significant
change in terms of betweenness centralization, identifies both of the time points
identified in the examination of degree centralization above plus an additional one,
September 2003 (time period 33). This latter time point coincides with the time
point when several of Noordin’s key leaders were either captured or killed in the
Figure 2. SNCD analysis: degree centralization.
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months following the August 2003 Marriot attack as well as when Pakistani authorities
began to roll up al-Ghuraba, a student group associated with Noordin that was under-
going training in Pakistan.
Figure 3. SNCD analysis: betweenness centralization.
Figure 4. SNCD analysis: fragmentation.
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The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the centralization measures find
additional empirical support from the SNCD analysis of the fragmentation (Figure 4)
and clustering coefficient (Figure 5) measures.12 The gray line in Figure 4 indicates
that Noordin’s network began to become significantly less fragmented (i.e. more cohe-
sive) around period 23 (December 2002), which is when Noordin acquired the materials
left over from the Christmas Day bombings. This increase in cohesion is not surprising
given Noordin’s need to maintain a low profile with the acquisition of the explosive
materials, particularly in an increasingly hostile environment following the October
2002 Bali Bombings and the subsequent removal of highly skilled and dedicated terror-
ists in its aftermath. Figure 5 indicates that a significant change in the average clustering
coefficient can be traced back to somewhere between time period 24 and 28 (January
2003 and May 2003), which again is not too long after Noordin acquired the Christmas
Day bombing materials. Figure 5 also suggests that a significant change occurred at
time period 36 (December 2003), which as noted above is when Pakistani authorities
rolled up the al-Ghuraba group and several members of Noordin’s key leaders were
either captured or killed.
8. Discussion
The findings above illustrate the potential usefulness of SNCD analysis. As seen above,
SNCD of Noordin’s network suggests that significant changes occurred in his network
at about the time he acquired bombing materials from the 2000 Christmas Day bomb-
ings, when several of his network’s members were captured or killed, and when he
himself and three of his key associates were killed. Table 1 summarizes these
results. Of these events, the crucial one, at least in terms of being able to have prevented
Noordin from carrying out his attacks, was when he acquired the bombing materials.
Figure 5. SNCD analysis: average clustering coefficient.
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This does not mean to imply that Indonesian authorities should have been able to
foresee what Noordin was planning to do. They did not have access to the data used
in this analysis nor could they have been aware of SNCD because it had yet to be
applied to changes in social networks. Indeed, this article is not meant as a critique
of Indonesian authorities. Rather, by using retrospective data, it is intended to
explore whether and how this approach to analyzing longitudinal network data can
be used by analysts, not just in Indonesia, but around the world so that future attacks
can be thwarted and analysts can better understand how dark networks evolve over
time.
That said, SNCD is not without its weaknesses. Few methodological approaches
are. Its inability to detect significant changes in network topography at key time
periods highlights some of the potential weaknesses of this approach. For instance,
the analysis above did not identify significant changes prior to several major attacks,
including the 2004 Australian Embassy Bombings, the 2005 Second Bali bombings,
and the 2009 Hotel bombings. This was the case even after adjusting the model’s par-
ameters (e.g. using different significance thresholds, varying the number of networks as
a baseline to which to compare later changes). It is not entirely clear whether this is due
to the challenges of identifying the ideal set of model parameters or if the network
simply did not behave radically different prior to those attacks. Clearly, the issue of
setting the appropriate model parameters is of particular concern and will certainly
require further examination in the future. For example, a threshold of 2.5 would
Table 1. Summary of results.
Time
periods






Shortly after the first Bali bombing,
Noordin acquires a cache of











Several key leaders were captured




The Al-Ghuraba group (student
cell), which was associated with
Noordin and was in the process





Decrease in degree and
betweenness
centralization
Noordin and other key leaders were
killed by Indonesian authorities
Fifty-six terrorists (some of whom
were members of Noordin’s
network) were killed or arrested
by Indonesian authorities in
Aceh
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have identified times 0 and 13 as key periods for degree centralization (Figure 2). The
former period is relatively unimportant given that it is the first time period in our analy-
sis, but time 13 (January 2002) marks when Noordin fled Malaysia for Indonesia (Inter-
national Crisis Group, 2006). Thus, as we noted above, in determining what constitutes
a significant change, analysts need to draw heavily on experience and be willing to
adjust expectations in light of new information. Indeed, initially, they may want to
risk a few “false positives” as they seek to identify the appropriate threshold level.
A few additional factors may have contributed to the inability to detect significant
changes in network structure prior to Noordin’s operations. One is that SNCD works
best when the stochastic process being monitored is normally distributed (McCulloh
& Carley, 2011). That is not the case here (and is probably true for a lot of dark net-
works) and may account for SNCD’s inability to detect some of the significant
changes in the network. Another is that this study examined historical data and there-
fore cannot speak entirely for SNCD’s ability (or inability) to detect significant network
changes, particularly in real time. It is plausible that a real-time analysis of the Noordin
network could have revealed significant changes in network centralization and/or cohe-
sion if such data and this method had been available during the period in which the
network operated. In fact, the development of new techniques, such as the CORE
Lab’s Dynamic Twitter Network Analysis tool, which is able to download and
analyze (using SNA) publicly available Twitter data in near real time (Dudas, 2012),
is likely to lead to new advances in analyzing longitudinal network data and assist in
measuring SNCD’s effectiveness.13 It is also possible that SNCD may have identified
additional significant changes if other topographical measures (e.g. average degree, clo-
seness centralization) or different network configurations (e.g. Noordin’s communi-
cation network) had been used. As it has recently been noted (Everton, 2012;
Roberts & Everton, 2011), the range of possible strategies and methodological
approaches to tracking and disrupting dark networks are considerable and thus
require patience and persistence on the part of researchers and analysts.
These limitations do not necessarily negate the utility of SNCD, however. Even so,
the analysis of dark networks should not be confused with decision-making, which
depends on a wide variety of issues (e.g. knowledge of local context and culture,
and the assessment of risks, costs, and potential for unintended consequences). In
other words, SNA in general, and SNCD in particular, should inform decision-
making, but it should not determine it (Everton, 2012; Roberts & Everton, 2011).
9. Conclusion
This article has tested the potential usefulness of SNCD analysis. It is a method that can
alert analysts as to whether and when a sudden change has occurred in a network,
which, in turn, allows them to identify potential causes for the change and possibly
prevent (but not predict) unwanted future events. As it was shown, SNCD does particu-
larly well in illuminating the effects of important exogenous shocks on network struc-
ture, such as the significant changes caused by Noordin’s acquisition of the leftover
explosive materials, the dismantling of the al-Ghuraba cells, the removal of several
key Bali bombers, and the deaths of Noordin and a few of his close associates. To
be sure, we would expect a sudden change to occur in a dark network if its key
leaders were removed, so the fact that SNCD picked up on this change is unsurprising.
What would be disturbing is if it did not detect this change. Then, the usefulness of
SNCD would be called into question. However, that is one of the primary motivations
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for this article – to see if it is able to detect known significant changes using well-
documented historical data.
While this analysis has demonstrated the potential of SNCD, it has also noted its
limitations. Additional testing and research are needed in order to better specify the par-
ameters used in the analysis of longitudinal dark network data with SNCD. Moreover,
this article only analyzed the combination of the alive and free operational and trust net-
works, but as Table 2 indicates, several different configurations of Noordin’s network
are possible. These networks, like the ones examined in this article, provide specific
advantages for testing the effectiveness of SNCD, including high resolution (time
coded by month) and little missing data. Future research should not only focus on ana-
lyzing similar data (i.e. where the data are relatively complete) but also “deficient” data
since analysts are often forced to work with incomplete data.
Additionally, this methodology needs to be applied to dark networks in other con-
texts in order to further explore its usefulness. For example, the authors intend to apply
SNCD to network data of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – FARC), an insurgent group based in Colombia
that is believed to be the oldest and, at its height, the largest guerrilla group in the world
(Cunningham, Everton, & Wilson, 2012). The FARC differs significantly from
Noordin’s network in terms of its structure, and it is operating in a completely different
environment in terms of the counter-insurgency strategies it faces, its alliances with
other networks, and so on (Cunningham et al., 2012). More importantly, an SNCD
analysis of the FARC would represent a step towards near real-time analysis since,
unlike Noordin’s network, the group continues to operate. Such an analysis would
not only provide insights into how network topography changes over time in light of
a hostile environment, but it should also provide additional understanding with
regard to how SNCD can be applied to monitor abrupt changes in dark networks and
further measure its utility for examining networks in near real time.
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Notes
1. To be clear, SNCD does not claim to predict future events. It is simply a tool that provides
analysts with the potential to detect significant changes in network topography. Once (or if)
Table 2. Possible configurations of Noordin Top network.
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a change is identified, analysts can then hone in on that specific time period and examine
the potential causes of that change and determine whether preventative actions are in order.
2. Much of what is known about dark networks in the field of social network analysis is rooted
in the research of bright networks. For example, the notion of a scale-free network, as dis-
cussed by Sageman (2003, 2004), was first developed by Barabasi and his colleagues
(Albert, Jeong, & Barabási, 2000; Barabási, 2002; Barabási & Albert, 1999; Barabási,
Albert, & Jeong, 1999; Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003).
3. Somewhat analogous to these studies are those that have examined the ability of scale-free
dark networks to withstand targeted and random attacks (Sageman, 2004; Xu et al., 2009).
4. In addition to this standard approach to calculating network fragmentation, an alternative
measure takes into account the (path) distance between actors (Borgatti, 2006). This
measure is not currently implemented in ORAw, however, so it is not used here.
5. The local clustering coefficient, Ci, is also known as ego network density and has been used by
social network analysts as a measure of local network structure for some time (Davis, 1967).
6. Originally formed as a breakaway faction of Darul Islam, JI has its roots in the Soviet war
in Afghanistan. The founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, began sending
fighters to Camp Sadda in Pakistan around 1985 where many future JI leaders learned
invaluable skills they would eventually bring back to the South East Asia. The group
was formally established in 1993 with the aim of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia,
which eventually expanded into the goal of a regional caliphate. Throughout the decade,
JI became increasingly violent by facilitating, supporting, and participating in Indonesian
communal conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The group, however, is best known
for the October 2002 Bali bombings that resulted in 202 deaths. For more information on
JI’s history, see Ressa (2003) and Conboy (2006).
7. According to Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center, the network operated under the fol-
lowing names: Al-Qaeda Asia Tenggara (2009); Al-Qaeda Indonesia (2009); Tandzim
Qaedatul-Jihad untuk Gugusan Melayu (2005); Brigade Firaqul Maut (2004); Anshorul
Muslimin (2004); and Thoifah Muqatilah (2004).
8. One-mode data consist of a single set of actors and the relationships between them, where
the actors can be people, organizations, events, nation-states, etc. Two-mode data, often
referred to as affiliation matrices, differ from one-mode in that they consist of two sets
of actors and the relationships between them, such as people and organizations, or
people and events.
9. All relationships used for this analysis have been clearly defined in a codebook. The “soul-
mate” network, for example, is a one-mode network where two actors share a tie if they
were affiliated with the same religious institutional affiliation (church, mosque, synagogue,
etc.) at the same time.
10. Unfortunately, dark network data present analysts with challenges more acute than when
working with bright network data, including the problem of identifying the exact time in
which a tie formed or dissolved. This analysis is no exception. It is recognized that this
assumption may affect the topographic measures used in this analysis and therefore the
results. For example, it is possible that two actors may end their friendship at any given
point in time. Because it is clear that many “friendships” existed between actors in this
data set, the authors believe excluding friendship relations would be more problematic
to this analysis than including them. The authors sought to mitigate these potential
affects by adhering to strict guidelines for coding friendship relations (in fact, all relation-
ship types) through a codebook. Here, friendship ties are defined as “close attachments
through affection or esteem between two people whose relationship remains close and con-
sistent across time.”
11. This baseline is based on a discussion the authors had with Ian McCulloh and additional
research.
12. Some readers will note that the number of periods displayed in Figures 4 and 5 differs from
those in Figures 2 and 3. This is because ORAw only displays those time periods when
significant changes occur. In other words, no significant change in fragmentation and clus-
tering was detected beyond the 28th and 40th time periods.
13. Nevertheless, using historical data to evaluate new methodologies such as SNCD is invalu-
able because key events in a network’s history are well known and thus can help in the
evaluation process.
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